An Assessment of China's Internal Decay

By: DENG Yuwen （邓聿文）

【Editor’s Note: The author argues that the Chinese regime's societal condition should be characterized as "decay" rather than "collapse." While "decay" suggests a pervasive degeneration within the social body, critical organizational structures remain functional, preventing immediate systemic breakdown. The regime’s decline began under Hu Jintao and worsened under Xi Jinping, whose centralization of power exacerbated internal decay. Six manifestations of this decay include: "reverse power out of control" due to unchecked authority, uncontrollable corruption, rigid "zombie ideology," collapsed social confidence leading to emigration and passive resistance, increased incidents of social revenge, and economic decline exacerbated by asset seizures. Xi's policies have not only failed to halt decay but also intensified it, leaving little hope for genuine reform.】

For years, sociologists have favored the term "collapse" to describe China's societal condition. This year, the situation appears graver, leading many to believe that the Chinese Communist regime won't survive for more than a few years. However, I prefer to describe the current phase as one of "decay."

In my view, there is a difference in degree between these two terms. While "decay" also indicates widespread cellular degeneration and necrosis within the social body, the organizational systems that maintain societal operations are still largely functional. They have not yet reached the point of complete breakdown, where a mere push would cause the entire system to collapse. The day when the regime's organizational systems, from top to bottom, are paralyzed will be the day when widespread social resistance truly begins.

However, in discussing China's internal decay, we must recognize that this phenomenon did not emerge during Xi Jinping's era; it was already evident during the latter years of Hu Jintao's leadership. At that time, political stagnation had reached a significant level, and both within and outside the Party, the entire society awaited Xi's rise to power with hopes of radical reforms. Xi indeed aimed to save the Communist Party and transform China, but after a decade, he has prescribed the wrong remedies, exacerbating the internal decay daily. The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee was his attempt to administer a new treatment for China's internal decay under the banner of reform. Still, judging by the public response, the results were evidently poor.

To understand China's internal decay, I have divided it into six aspects, which could be called the six manifestations of internal decay.

Manifestation One: Reverse Power Out of Control Due to Absolute Power

Since becoming the core leader of the CCP, Xi has distanced himself from other Politburo members, a situation that reached its peak during the 20th National Congress, where he stood above the Central Committee, wielding absolute power, becoming an "emperor without the title of emperor." Although this power appears somewhat weakened at present, he remains high above others, as evidenced by the title of "Special Envoy of Xi Jinping." Special envoy diplomacy by the highest leader is a common practice, though not frequently used, in the foreign policies of various countries. However, Xi has normalized the practice, frequently sending someone as his special envoy to visit other countries. In recent years, leading cadres who acted as "Xi's envoys" were generally ministers, occasionally vice-chairmen of the National People's Congress, vice-chairmen of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, or vice-premiers. However, since the beginning of this year, even leaders of the Politburo Standing Committee, such as Wang Huning and Han Zheng, have visited foreign countries as Xi's envoys. This is highly irregular, indicating that supreme power is severely out of control, with no forces within the Party able to restrain him.

Power out of control, in its true sense, refers to the absence of both internal and external constraints. In the past, while power lacked external constraints, there were still some internal checks, even on supreme power. For example, Deng Xiaoping had Chen Yun, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao had the elders, and there were other factional forces to balance power. However, Xi has no such forces to check his authority. On the surface, it appears that with absolute power, Xi's directives are carried out, but in reality, obedience to him has become a formality, with collective inertia taking hold. Few officials are genuinely working diligently for the Party or the country; most adopt a perfunctory attitude, simply trying to avoid trouble, with no regard for national, public, or even systemic interests. The spirit of the officials has not changed, and power at all levels remains unchecked. To maintain their positions, they avoid taking any action or responsibility, even to the extent of implementing repressive policies and measures. From the perspective of power's responsibility and the effectiveness of governance, this phenomenon can be termed as reverse power out of control.

Manifestation Two: Uncontrollable Corruption

Corruption is precisely the result of power out of control. Ironically, Xi's anti-corruption efforts are unprecedented, yet according to official statistics, the number of officials investigated each year, particularly among high-level cadres, has been increasing since 2018. For example, in the first seven months of this year alone, 38 high-level cadres were investigated, seven of whom were at the ministerial level. This number surpasses the total for all of last year. The same is true for the military; the corruption case in the Rocket Force exposed last year and the downfall of two consecutive defense ministers confirm that military corruption is no less severe than in the Party and government.

Xi has been fighting corruption for ten years, yet the number of officials brought down increases each year, demonstrating that in a one-party, one-man system, corruption cannot be effectively curbed, regardless of how many anti-corruption mechanisms are established within the CCP. The reason lies in the Party's dictatorship, which does not allow external oversight; relying solely on internal supervision cannot govern corruption. Moreover, in a one-man rule, anti-corruption serves the needs of the supreme ruler. On the one hand, to legitimize one-man rule, anti-corruption efforts cannot be relaxed; on the other hand, anti-corruption must not destabilize one-man rule, causing the regime to loosen its grip. These two objectives are inherently contradictory, ensuring that corruption remains uncontrollable.

Manifestation Three: Zombie Ideology

The CCP's ideology has become completely ossified, losing all appeal and inspiration to the masses. However, this is not the fault of the ideology itself; it is the inevitable consequence of the Party becoming a tool of Xi's one-man rule. The CCP claims to be a revolutionary party, and a revolutionary party's specialty lies in its ability to be highly motivating and inspirational, capable of mobilizing the masses to strive and even sacrifice for a lofty goal. However, the prerequisite for this is a set of bewitching revolutionary ideals and ideologies. The CCP had this in the past during its Revolutionary and Cultural Revolution days. After the reform and opening-up, political pragmatism replaced revolutionary fervor, and the Party's ideology gradually returned to mediocrity and became rigid.

Once Xi established his one-man rule, the Party's ideology completely lost its flexibility, becoming a "zombie" that served as a poor defense of his rule. The "Four Consciousnesses," the "Four Confidences," the "Two Safeguards," and the "Two Establishes" (四个意识, 四个自信, 两个维护, 两个确立) are both incantations and viruses, used to brainwash Party members and the masses, turning them into obedient tools for Xi. No divergence from the regime's views and positions is allowed, not even from the regime's propagandists, even if they are motivated by a love for the Party. For example, Hu Xijin (胡锡进) occasionally makes comments that differ from the official stance and is silenced, even labeled a "public intellectual" by some patriotic citizens, a clear indication of the extent of China's internal decay.

Manifestation Four: Collapse of Social Confidence, People Voting with Their Feet

Political repression, economic downturn, and restricted freedom define China's current state. For most Chinese people, realizing that this situation will not only persist but could worsen over the next decade has triggered a natural response of anxiety and a collapse of confidence in the future. Today, a common feature can be felt across various social strata—from the grassroots to the middle class, from outside the Party to within, from intellectuals to entrepreneurs, from ordinary civil servants to mid- and high-level officials: anxiety, with no prospects for personal advancement or hope for the nation. Unemployment threats, declining incomes, reduced pensions, and heavy mortgages are realities many Chinese face daily. For officials, it's the unending political studies, loyalty tests to the leader, and anti-corruption pressures. Entrepreneurs fare no better, struggling with cash flow issues, bankruptcy, or the threat thereof. Intellectuals suffer from the inability to speak freely. People are weary of the regime's hollow propaganda. Those who want to change their fate either emigrate or smuggle themselves out of China, seeking any means to "润" (run). Those who don't seek change either passively or willingly adopt a "lying flat" approach.

It now seems that China's social confidence crisis will persist at least until Xi steps down, but it's unclear when that will be. Based on the recent Third Plenary Session, if his health permits, he could very well remain in power for another ten years. Thus, the most agonizing times may yet be ahead.

Manifestation Five: Frequent Social Revenge, China Entering a Mutual Harm Mode

In recent years, China has witnessed multiple incidents where young people who initially had no connection met online and agreed to commit suicide together, as well as cases of brutal assaults, some even involving foreigners in China. Whether it’s the suicidal or the assailants, they are mostly from society’s lower strata—sociologically, they are the weak or the failures. Although the specific motives for each case differ, the fact that so many have occurred in recent years naturally reflects severe social problems.

In these cases, it's easy to see that they chose suicide or violence against others because they were desperate about their fates, believing they had no power to change their situation. Especially those who commit indiscriminate violence against innocent people often perceive that they have been subjected to clear or perceived injustices. After finding no recourse in society, they choose to vent their anger on unrelated people, exacting social revenge. China's history is filled with violent incidents related to revenge, indicating that such incidents have deeper historical and social roots in China. With the current regime showing no interest in social reforms, the situation is only worsening.

Social revenge is also a manifestation of a revenge mentality among the people, often provoked by the authorities. In recent years, under Xi's one-man rule, the social revenge mentality has evolved into an intense mutual harm mode, where each side relentlessly attacks the other. Social revenge is a passive form of mutual harm, but there is an active side. Chinese society has been sliding toward a condition where various societal groups take advantage of and harm each other. From the CCP's extreme political practices to its high-pressure policies against ordinary citizens, from the contradictions between the rich and the poor to the privileged exploiting the disadvantaged, every sector, group, and individual acts as if they are in a battle. The recent surge in mortgage repayment boycotts reflects this. With the regime showing no interest in social reforms, it is only aggravating this trend.

Manifestation Six: Seizing State-Owned Assets as a Solution to Economic Problems

For a long time, the CCP has pursued an unsustainable model of resource development, producing exports, polluting the environment, and accumulating debt to achieve rapid economic growth. To support this, the CCP has turned to seizing assets and taxing the people as essential methods for addressing economic problems. This is evident in the current economic downturn, with the CCP demanding that state-owned enterprises tighten their belts and maintain operations. The forced contributions from private enterprises and high taxes have become widespread, pushing society into a survival mode where people no longer have the resources or willingness to invest in the future. China's economy has entered a period of significant decline, with low confidence in economic recovery. With limited resources and ongoing internal decay, this trend appears irreversible.

In conclusion, the six manifestations of China's internal decay reflect a deep-seated crisis within the country. Xi's one-man rule has exacerbated these issues, leading to a bleak outlook for the future. The internal decay of China is not just a symptom of the current regime but an ongoing process that has been accelerated by Xi's policies. Without significant reforms, this decay will continue to erode the foundations of Chinese society, leading to further instability and unrest.

Key Takeaways:

Absolute power has led to reverse power out of control, with no internal checks within the CCP.

Corruption remains rampant despite extensive anti-corruption efforts.

Ideology has become rigid and uninspiring, serving as a tool for Xi's one-man rule.

Social confidence has collapsed, leading to widespread anxiety and a desire to emigrate.

Social revenge incidents reflect deep-seated societal issues and a mutual harm mentality.

Economic decline is exacerbated by the CCP's reliance on seizing assets and taxing the people.

In sum, China's internal decay is a multifaceted problem that requires urgent attention. However, under the current regime, the prospects for meaningful reform are bleak, and the country will likely face continued challenges in the years ahead.

August 27, 2024

This is a commentary written by Deng Yuwen for Voice of America. This special commentary does not represent the views of Voice of America. For reprints, please credit VOA.】