As China’s Population and Civilization Rapidly Decline, What Great Rejuvenation Can There Be?

中国人口与文明快速衰落 何谈伟大复兴？

By Yi Fuxian (易富贤)

【Editor’s Note： Fushun, once a vibrant industrial hub surpassing many provincial capitals, now exemplifies China’s demographic crisis. Low fertility rates have accelerated aging and eroded economic vitality. According to population expert Yi Fuxian, other cities nationwide may soon follow this trajectory, given that the Northeast’s demographic shifts prefigure the country’s future. Even relatively youthful cities like Shenzhen face a looming fertility downturn despite large inflows of migrants. Government policies encouraging rural migration to cities only exacerbate the problem, as high housing costs discourage childbearing and depress fertility further. Attempts to replicate the Shenzhen model in places like Shenfu New City are unlikely to succeed without a sufficient influx of young talent. Yi argues that reversing negative population growth is implausible: China’s historic one-child policy pushed fertility rates off a cliff. Government incentives or slogans cannot counter entrenched economic pressures, and the nation’s declining labor force, coupled with astronomical housing costs, ensures a grim demographic outlook.】

A persistently low fertility rate accelerates aging and fuels a comprehensive socioeconomic downturn—this is the stark reality that Fushun (抚顺) exemplifies. In an exclusive interview with this broadcaster, the population expert Yi Fuxian (易富贤) discusses whether major Chinese cities will inevitably follow Fushun's path, sliding from past glory into decline.

Journalist: Under the national spectrum of China’s population structure, why can Fushun be viewed as a “classic case” of representativeness?

Yi Fuxian: The fertility decline in the Northeast led the rest of the country by more than a decade. Thus, a dozen years from now, China’s age structure will resemble what we see today in the Northeast. In particular, Fushun was once emblematic of China’s industrialization, having surpassed many provincial capitals in its heyday. But with the onslaught of aging, its economic vitality inevitably waned. Fushun’s trajectory offers a snapshot of what other cities may face as demographics shift nationwide.

Journalist: Are there other cities whose demographic developments are even more significant than what we see in Fushun?

Yi Fuxian: Fushun is merely one example. Across the Northeast, particularly in Heilongjiang (黑龙江), some places face population structures even more severe than Fushun’s, with deeper aging and lower birthrates.

Fushun is part of China’s rust belt, and if we compare it with Wayne County (韦恩县) in Michigan (密西根州)—America’s rust belt—we see that the American situation is more favorable. For example, Wayne County, which includes Detroit (底特律), has a population of about 1.7 million, roughly similar to Fushun’s. Yet last year, Fushun registered just over 5,000 births, while Wayne County recorded around 20,000. In other words, China’s demographic crisis is far more severe than that of America’s Rust Belt.

Journalist: How should we view cities like Shenzhen (深圳), which attract large numbers of migrant residents?

Yi Fuxian: Currently, Shenzhen’s population structure is the most dynamic in China—its average age is only in the thirties, whereas the national average is in the forties. Yet Shenzhen also faces challenges; its fertility rate is extremely low, below 1.0. While Shenzhen symbolizes China’s present vitality, it could eventually follow the same aging path as Fushun.

The relatively milder aging in places like Beijing (北京) and Shanghai (上海) also stems from significant inflows of young migrants. About half their populations come from elsewhere and remain relatively youthful. That influx of youth has so far prevented a noticeable economic downturn. However, over time, even these metropolises may not escape the inevitable demographic drag.

Journalist: As one of China’s youngest cities, how long will it take Shenzhen to resemble Fushun?

Yi Fuxian: Shenzhen may fare somewhat better because it still has a few decades to go. Among major cities, Tianjin (天津) will likely be the first to follow Fushun’s path, as its ability to attract new residents is declining, and its aging is already quite severe.

Shenzhen may have another 20 to 30 years before it faces a scenario akin to Fushun’s. Tianjin, on the other hand, could start manifesting those trends in just a few years.

Journalist: The Chinese government’s efforts to transform rural populations into urban residents aim to boost domestic demand and absorb the housing bubble. What impact might this have on population structure?

Yi Fuxian: The government wants rural residents to move into the cities to stimulate demand and help digest the real estate oversupply. However, this policy carries hidden dangers. Migrant workers moving to cities face enormous pressure—housing costs are astronomical, making it nearly impossible to afford to raise children. If they had remained in rural areas or small towns, the cost of raising one or two children would be far more manageable. Once they move to larger cities, even having one child might be prohibitive. This urban migration could further depress fertility rates and, over time, undermine economic growth.

Journalist: Take Shenfu New City (沈抚新城), situated between Shenyang (沈阳) and Fushun. The government has funneled resources there, hoping it will become another Shenzhen by attracting emerging high-tech industries. Could this affect the population structure?

Yi Fuxian: Such an outcome is impossible. Shenzhen thrived when China’s average age hovered around the twenties, supported by massive inflows of young talent. Shenfu New City is now dealing with a population whose average age is close to fifty, reflecting an old demographic base. Without sufficient young people, economic development cannot take off. Many of China’s new “model” cities may end up as ghost towns that fail to attract residents.

Journalist: China’s current pro-birth policies aim to reverse negative population growth. Could the birthrate turn positive again in the coming years?

Yi Fuxian: It’s impossible. Fertility doesn’t respond to a simple government directive—childbearing is not a faucet you can turn on and off at will. China’s family planning policy was extraordinarily effective in suppressing birthrates. Even without such policies, fertility would have declined over time, as seen in places like Taiwan (台湾), Korea (韩国), and Japan (日本). But China’s one-child policy was like pushing a massive boulder off a cliff rather than letting it roll down the slope naturally.

Now, encouraging births is akin to hauling that massive boulder back up the mountain—an exceedingly difficult task. With household incomes at just 44% of GDP, many families cannot afford to raise even one child, let alone two or three. No matter how much the government promotes or subsidizes, it will achieve little.

Housing prices in China are about 29 times the average annual income, compared to Japan’s factor of 11 and America’s factor of 3. With housing so expensive, who dares have children? Government slogans and small subsidies cannot solve such deep-rooted problems.

Journalist: You are pessimistic about China’s population. Could you give a concrete projection?

Yi Fuxian: Even if China somehow stabilizes its fertility rate at about 0.8, that would already be quite an achievement. Currently, Taiwan’s rate is around 0.8, Korea’s 0.7, Hong Kong (香港) 0.7, and Macau (澳门) just 0.6. Under such circumstances, China’s population could decline to 1 billion by 2050 and 300 million by 2100.

China’s share of the global population was once enormous: 37% in 1820, 22% in 1950, and still 22% in 1980. But today, it’s down to 16%. By 2050, it will be about 11%, and by 2100, just 3%.

While China currently accounts for 16% of the world’s total population, its share of global births is only 6%. By 2100, China’s share of global births will shrink to a mere 0.6%.

China thus faces a swift decline in both population and civilization, wholly contradicting the officially propagated notion of a “great national rejuvenation.” With the population in freefall, how can there be any genuine revival? The Chinese government remains wholly unaware of the looming demographic and civilizational collapse.

Journalist: Many people share your view that Chinese youth are reluctant to have children due to the high cost of raising them. How do you see the relationship between economic structures, future prospects, and population growth?

Yi Fuxian: Population is the primary driver of the economy. Without people, there can be no economic foundation. The age structure of a population decisively influences economic growth. International comparisons show that as the average age rises and the proportion of the elderly increases, economic growth declines. Conversely, a higher proportion of children correlates positively with growth. As the share of children shrinks, so does the growth rate.

China’s age structure now roughly resembles Japan’s in 1995. By around 2035 or 2040, it will resemble Japan’s current demographic profile. Thus, China’s economic growth will continue to slow.

China’s labor force began to decline in 2012, which coincided with the end of double-digit GDP growth. From 1979 to 2011, the average annual growth rate was 10%. However, as soon as the workforce started shrinking, growth rates fell from 9.6% in 2011 to 7% in 2015, 6% in 2019, and this year, possibly only 4.8%. In a few more years, it could be down to 3%, 2%, or even 1%. Real wage stagnation or negative wage growth may not be far off.

If the economy were thriving, raising children might become more feasible, and people would be more willing to have them. However, with China’s economic prospects dim, both the willingness and the capacity to raise children will only weaken. Economic stagnation will continue to depress fertility, creating a vicious cycle. This is why I remain deeply pessimistic about China’s demographic future.

This translation is authorized by the original author and undertaken by the China Thought Express editorial team. The original text can be found here: Radio Free Asia and Back China.

https://www.backchina.com/news/2024/12/12/948026.html

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