Hu Yaobang's crucial role in shaping the reform policies of the 1977-1987
By REN Xiaobin (任小彬)
【Editor’s Note: The essay recounts a personal encounter with Professor Ezra Vogel, known for his book Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. In 2015, the author was approached to provide insights on Hu Yaobang for Vogel’s research on a new book. While Vogel's work captured Deng's influence on China’s reform and opening up, the author felt his depiction lacked objectivity due to reliance on state-sponsored sources. During their meeting, the author emphasized Hu's crucial role in shaping the reform policies of the 1977-1987 period, notably his "Three Strategies" that laid the foundation for Deng's era. Despite Vogel’s sincere efforts, his understanding of Hu was less comprehensive, and with his passing, the planned book will remain unfinished. The essay concludes by reflecting on the limits of foreign perspectives on China’s complex historical narratives.】
Recently, I came across the sudden news online of Professor Ezra Vogel's (傅高义) passing in the United States. It reminded me that five years ago—in 2015—I had an encounter with him. Time indeed flies.
In the early winter of 2015, Li Shengping (李盛平) from the Hu Yaobang Historical Materials website unexpectedly called me. He mentioned that an American scholar, Ezra Vogel, who had written Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (《邓小平时代》), was now preparing to write about Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) and was collecting materials. He said, "Since you spent some time in the Organization Department and are quite familiar with Hu Yaobang's efforts in redressing unjust and false cases, would you be willing to speak with him?" I agreed enthusiastically.
We scheduled to meet on November 10th at Langyuan on the Peking University campus. Before the meeting, I downloaded an electronic version of Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China and quickly read through it. My overall impression was that while Vogel captured the main feature of Deng Xiaoping's era—namely, reform and opening up—which is commendable, during his stay in Beijing, he was mostly accommodated by hosting units. Consequently, much of his material came from so-called "theorists" or "experts." Some of this was relatively objective, but some carried a strong official bias. Therefore, while his book contains many objective observations, there are also elements that lack objectivity.
I particularly noted that it would be impossible for him to write about Deng Xiaoping without addressing Deng's later change in attitude toward Hu Yaobang and the significant setback this caused in China's reform and opening up. He certainly touched upon this "incident," but in the Chinese edition of Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, all related content was entirely deleted. So, I wasn't sure how he had written those chapters. Overall, I felt that although Vogel aimed to objectively and comprehensively portray various aspects of Deng Xiaoping's era, he was somewhat constrained, and his account was not entirely complete. Therefore, since he wanted to write about Hu Yaobang, I thought I could supplement his materials based on my experiences at the Party School and the Organization Department.
On the morning of November 10th, I arrived at Langyuan at Peking University and first met with Li Shengping. He led me to see Vogel. Professor Vogel was very warm, inviting me into an eastern side room of a traditional courtyard. There was a beautiful little courtyard outside, and his office was in the east wing; the room was quite cozy.
He was not very tall but greeted me enthusiastically with a handshake. I said, "Professor Vogel, you are in great health!" He then replied in very fluent Chinese, "Hello, hello, please have a seat." We began our conversation freely. He first asked for my name and where I had worked. Then, he inquired about my family situation. I briefly told him about my family, focusing mainly on how my father was persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命). He listened attentively and finally remarked, "Ah, the Cultural Revolution really harmed many people!"
I told him that my main purpose today was to talk about Hu Yaobang. "Since you're planning to write a biography, article, or book about him, and given that I had certain interactions with Hu Yaobang during our time at the Central Party School and the Central Organization Department, I wanted to share some relevant situations and exchange some views with you." He said, "Good, please go ahead."
I noticed that as I spoke, he listened carefully, occasionally taking notes. His secretary was also taking notes beside him. I mainly discussed a few key points. First, I said that while your book Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China names the era after Deng Xiaoping, summarizing the period from 1977 when Deng returned to power until his death—which is accurate—there was a critically important decade within this era, from 1977 to 1987. During this decade, many plans, strategies, and work were actually accomplished by Hu Yaobang, who played an irreplaceable and significant role.
I mentioned that, as far as I know, although Deng Xiaoping resumed work after the Cultural Revolution, he only truly returned to his duties starting in the summer of 1977. However, as early as 1976, Hu Yaobang had already begun contemplating China's future direction. On October 12th, just days after the arrest of the Gang of Four (四人帮), Hu Yaobang proposed three suggestions to Ye Jianying (叶剑英). Hu said:
"Now our cause faces a renaissance; winning people's hearts is paramount. What are the people's hearts? I believe there are three points: First, stop criticizing Deng Xiaoping; the people will greatly approve. Second, redress unjust cases; the people will rejoice. Third, vigorously promote production; the people's happiness will blossom."
Among these three points, the first was to cease the political movement criticizing Deng Xiaoping; the second was to redress the vast number of wrongful and unjust cases resulting from decades of political struggles; the third was to shift the Party's focus to economic construction. Ye Jianying praised Hu Yaobang's three suggestions as akin to Zhuge Liang's (诸葛亮) "Three Strategies at Longzhong" (隆中三策), serving as a grand plan to help the Chinese Communist Party and the nation escape crisis and reverse the situation in political, organizational, and economic realms. All three focused on "the people's hearts"—this truly embodied a people-centric approach.
Therefore, I told Vogel that as early as 1976, Hu Yaobang had a very clear mindset and had already proposed the necessity of transforming the ideological line, organizational line, and political line. Essentially, he fundamentally negated the Cultural Revolution and rejected the theory and practice of "continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat." At that time, there were no others with such macro-strategic vision who could articulate it in such straightforward language.
Moreover, Hu Yaobang didn't just offer suggestions; he took action. Under the determination of the "Two Regardless" (两个不管) policy—regardless of who made the decision and when it was made—he began working on redressing unjust and false cases as soon as he resumed work and arrived at the Central Party School in early 1977. I mentioned how Hu Yaobang, resisting various pressures, redressed the "Red Flag Corps" (红战团), a group labeled as a reactionary organization during the Cultural Revolution for opposing Kang Sheng (康生). This was the first case of redressing wrongful convictions after the Cultural Revolution, and I provided a detailed account of my personal experience during the Party School's exposure of Kang Sheng. To remove obstacles, Hu also organized the publication of two articles on implementing cadre policies and redressing unjust cases throughout the Party and the nation, which caused a tremendous response and shock.
I didn't discuss other specific cases with him because many such cases have been covered in works by comrades like Dai Huang (戴煌), and others had probably already talked to him about them. It wouldn't be very meaningful for me to recount specific cases again, so I focused on our "first case." I had arrived around 9:30 a.m., and by the time I finished speaking, it was nearly 11 a.m. Sensing that he might be getting tired, given his age, I decided to wrap up. We then went outside, took a couple of photos, and parted ways.
During our conversation, I felt that his understanding of Hu Yaobang was not as deep, extensive, or detailed as his understanding of Deng Xiaoping. I think this is related to his initial exposure in China, where he was surrounded by people like Deng Liqun (邓力群), leading to some preconceived notions and a certain constraint in his thinking. Therefore, he primarily wrote about the reform and opening up from the main thread of Deng Xiaoping, considering him the chief architect.
However, when I brought up specific issues, he seemed to be aware of some aspects and was also prepared to consult many people for an in-depth understanding. I felt that he genuinely wanted to invest effort in researching Hu Yaobang and intended to study him from a different perspective rather than merely within the grand backdrop of the Deng Xiaoping era. He aimed for a more in-depth and specific study—that was my impression.
Now that he has suddenly passed away, his book on Hu Yaobang will certainly remain unfinished. The materials he collected may only serve as resources for future research and analysis. Regardless, history stands as it is, and we cannot always rely on foreigners to speak for the Chinese. A vast amount of factual information is actually in the hands of the Chinese themselves. Hoping for foreigners to speak is essentially attempting to influence Chinese people through foreign voices. This intention was evident when Chairman Mao (毛主席) sought out Edgar Snow (斯诺) in Yan'an—it was to achieve propaganda goals through foreigners.
As for the influence of Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, how significant is it really? It might have had some impact abroad, but domestically, it has virtually none. Everyone experienced those events themselves; who would read his analyses? Frankly, his book doesn't offer much that is new. Therefore, my basic view is that for an elderly foreign scholar like Ezra Vogel, attempting to understand China's affairs is truly commendable. Initially, perhaps under the leadership of John Fairbank (费正清), their China Studies Institute went to great lengths to understand and analyze China and to propose policies toward China for the U.S. government—that was their original intent. After Vogel accepted the commission, he wrote Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, aiming to depict that period of history objectively.
On the other hand, why was the government willing to allow him to stay in China for so long and interview so many people? Similar to Mao's attitude toward Edgar Snow, they hoped he would say good things about China after he returned. However, during our exchange, I noticed that Vogel's thinking had undergone some changes. He genuinely wanted to explore the actual situation and thus asked me in detail about the Cultural Revolution and the redress of unjust cases in China, including why my father was imprisoned in Qincheng Prison (秦城监狱). I felt that his research was practical, specific, and meticulous.
Had Vogel continued along this line of inquiry to delve deeply into Hu Yaobang's contributions, he would inevitably have encountered many issues regarding the similarities and differences between Deng and Hu. In fact, the contributions of Hu Yaobang during the Deng Xiaoping era are a significant topic worthy of study. I believe that Hu Yaobang's "Three Strategies" (三策) proposed in October 1976 laid the foundation for the Deng Xiaoping era. The first strategy—to stop criticizing Deng Xiaoping—not only reflected public opinion but also created a favorable atmosphere for Deng's return to power; only with Deng's return could there be a Deng Xiaoping era. The second strategy liberated a large number of people and cadres, an effort that Hu Yaobang personally spearheaded, pushing forward with full force despite enormous pressure and overcoming much resistance from the higher-ups. This greatly liberated productive forces and unleashed immense material power for reform and opening up. The third strategy became the main theme of the Deng Xiaoping era: shifting the Party's focus to economic construction, necessitating domestic economic reform, and opening up to the outside world to create a new landscape for reform and opening up.
Therefore, if you regard the Deng Xiaoping era as an epoch, the first ten years—from 1977 to 1987, when Hu Yaobang was in charge—were exceptionally brilliant. Hu Yaobang advanced along the path of the Three Strategies, making enormous, historic, and foundational contributions to reform and opening up. His resignation led to historical setbacks. Due to his limitations, Vogel did not fully understand Hu Yaobang's contributions and thus did not entirely objectively depict the respective roles of Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang. This issue is not something Vogel could have thoroughly researched; it requires those who lived through that era to provide convincing answers.
I offer this short essay in memory of Professor Ezra Vogel.
Written on December 27, 2020
Published in Huaxia Digest on October 8, 2024