Reexamining the Crux of China's Land Issues and the Landlord Class

—Article Three of the Series on Violent Land Reform

By MAO Jiasheng (茆家升)

【Editor’s Note： Traditional education in China has long portrayed the rural landscape as dominated by intense class struggles, with landlords oppressing landless farmers, prompting peasant uprisings that led to dynastic changes. However, this narrative oversimplifies history. The primary conflict in rural China has been between government authorities and peasants, including small and medium landlords, rather than strictly between landlords and farmers. Land ownership, starting from the Warring States period's land privatization, became central to societal conflicts, as the state-controlled the distribution of agricultural wealth. Throughout Chinese history, emperors and later Mao Zedong centralized power and wealth, leading to ongoing disputes over how this wealth—particularly agricultural land—was shared, forming the backdrop to many of China's historical struggles. Over time, land reform movements, especially during Mao’s era, aimed at redistributing wealth but often resulted in violence and misrepresentation of historical realities regarding landlords and peasants.】

"To take all the benefits of the world unto oneself, and to shift all the world's misfortunes onto others... viewing the world as the greatest enterprise, passing it on to one's descendants, and enjoying it endlessly."

—Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲)

For many years, traditional education has taught us that China's countryside is fraught with severe class contradictions and class struggles. The rural landlord and rich peasant classes viciously annex land and cruelly oppress and exploit landless and land-poor farmers. Poor peasants hired laborers, and tenant farmers, in order to survive, were compelled to rise up—even to the point of initiating peasant uprisings that overthrew dynasties. On the surface, these theories seem plausible, but they contradict the facts.

The reality is that, since ancient times, although China's rural areas have been focal points of various conflicts, the primary contradiction has been between government authorities and peasants—including small and medium landlords—not between landlords and peasants. Why do I say this? Let's begin with a brief historical review.

We can trace back to the Warring States period, when Legalists in the state of Qin implemented reforms to "abolish the well-field system and open boundaries" (废井田，开阡陌), eliminating the communal well-field system characterized by strong kinship ties, and instituting land privatization. This was perhaps the origin of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's (孙中山) proposal of "land to the tiller."

However, the dividends from land involve all sectors of society; everyone wants a share of the pie. This is the crux of China's land issues. Strictly speaking, from ancient times until the pre-reform era, all Chinese people relied on the land for survival. In other words, during periods of low productivity, only the land and its agricultural products constituted the sole "big cake," and everyone wanted a slice. So how should the cake be divided reasonably? It can be said that all social conflicts center around how to cut this cake.

Historically, China has revered the cult of force; whoever holds the greatest power has the final say. And who holds the greatest power? Naturally, the rulers of successive dynasties. Therefore, during feudal times, the basic rule for dividing the cake was: "Under the heavens, all land belongs to the king; at the edges of the land, all are the king's subjects" (普天之下，莫非王土；率土之滨，莫非王臣). All the people were the emperor's subjects and true ownership of all land naturally belonged to the emperor. How to cut the cake was up to the emperor!

By the time of Mao (毛), especially during the People's Commune era that combined government and society, all common people became part of the state apparatus—still subjects. All wealth, including land, factories, mines, and various resources, belonged to the rulers. When Mao (毛) achieved absolute leadership, the nation's wealth nearly became his private property, just like the feudal emperors. How to cut the cake was, of course, decided by Mao (毛)!

If the emperor or Mao (毛) decides how to cut the cake, what's there to discuss? Just follow orders—what's the point of further debate?

But things are not as simple as they appear. Although over two thousand years ago, feudal emperors were, as Tan Sitong (谭嗣同) put it, all thieves—national traitors and usurpers—each more greedy and shameless than the last. As Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲) said: "To take all the benefits of the world unto oneself, and to shift all the world's misfortunes onto others... viewing the world as the greatest enterprise, passing it on to one's descendants, and enjoying it endlessly." They all wanted to swallow the land dividends—the big cake—entirely by themselves.

However, land is not immediately a cake (though nowadays, the government's massive land sales have turned it into one). The land needs cultivation to produce grain and other agricultural products, which become wealth—the cake. If the emperor or rulers swallow all the grain, and the farmers who produce it starve, how can production continue? How will people in all industries serving the land survive? Who will contribute wealth to the emperor, whether named Mao (毛) or not, next year? To keep slicing the big cake continuously, the emperor cannot avoid sharing a piece with farmers and related workers. As for how much to share, the conflict between rulers and the ruled will never be reconciled. As Mao (毛) famously said during the Great Leap Forward (大跃进): "Our contradiction with the peasants is that the state wants to take a bit more, and the peasants want to eat a bit more" (see Yanhuang Chunqiu 【《炎黄春秋》】, 2011, Issue 10, p. 25). Such disputes and struggles for vital interests and survival constitute history.

Specifically, rulers represented by monarchs were often cruel and tyrannical, extremely greedy, levying exorbitant taxes and oppressive levies on the common people, leaving them destitute and full of resentment. If natural disasters occurred or wars broke out, the people would rise up against the emperor and all levels of rulers—this is peasant rebellion. The uprisings led by Chen Sheng and Wu Guang at the end of the Qin dynasty, the Yellow Turbans at the end of the Han, Zhu Yuanzhang, Zhang Shicheng, and Yang Yao at the end of the Yuan, Li Zicheng at the end of the Ming, the White Lotus Society in the mid-Qing, and Hong Xiuquan at the end of the Qing—all were conflicts with government authorities. In eras of imperial supremacy, those oppressed and exploited also included some small and medium landlords.

As for Mao's (毛) discussion in the "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (《湖南农民运动考察报告》) about landlords' vicious land annexation and their oppression and exploitation of landless and land-poor peasants—leading to class contradictions, class struggle, and even peasant uprisings (some scholars refer to this as "tenant rebellions")—such events are scarcely recorded in China's millennia-long history.

They are absent from official histories but present in folklore. Stories like The White-Haired Girl (《白毛女》), Cock Crows at Midnight (《半夜鸡叫》), Nan Batian (《南霸天》), Rent Collection Courtyard (《收租院》), and numerous novels, plays, and paintings reflecting land reform—aren't these examples? Some even made it into primary and secondary school textbooks. However, they cannot withstand the test of practice; they are merely products of ideology. Recent investigations into these typical stories have revealed that none are true; some distort facts, others are based on hearsay, and some are pure fabrications. Especially Rent Collection Courtyard (《收租院》), which grotesquely inverts black and white: the heinous, villainous landlord Liu Wencai (刘文彩), who allegedly set up private water prisons and killed at will, turned out to be a great philanthropist. In 1992, the Propaganda Department of the Dayi County Party Committee in Sichuan Province, Liu's hometown, conducted a survey and found that historically, the person who contributed most to Dayi County was Liu Wencai—the great philanthropist! In 1995, County Magistrate Jin Jiaxiang (金嘉祥) sought truth from facts and planned to restore the old name "Wencai Middle School" (文彩中学), but was obstructed and failed.

In such a vast country, the rural wealth gap has always existed. Tenant relationships and the hiring of long-term laborers are widespread. Their relationships are diverse. Among them, of course, are the rich and unkind and a few who are malicious and willfully persecute tenants and laborers. Being wealthy, some even have official backgrounds and are a strong group; tenants and hired workers are weak groups. Significant differences in social status and living standards inevitably lead to frequent social conflicts due to social inequality.

However, overall, in the past two thousand years, rural society—except for certain periods—has been relatively stable, developing corresponding cultural traditions and moral concepts. The formation of this model has deep political backgrounds: the teachings and infiltration of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism; the constraints of patriarchal society; experiences and lessons from numerous major events, including multiple dynastic changes and great turmoil; and factors like the Chinese national character's conservatism and compliance.

Facing such a relatively stable situation in China's countryside over two millennia, interpretations can vary. Here, a critical issue is how to understand the small and medium landlords widely present in rural areas—how did they accumulate their wealth? What roles did they play in economic development, political stability, preservation of traditional culture, and responses to natural and man-made disasters? Especially in conflicts between the government and the people, did they side with oppressors, or did they offer some protection to common folk—even if such protection stemmed more from self-interest? Ultimately, were this large group of people basically good or bad? These factors determine how successive governments should correctly treat them to stand the test of history and justice. This is also one of our significant disagreements with Mao (毛) and the pro-Mao faction.

Mao (毛) and the Maoists believe, as mentioned above that violent land reform is fully justified—a necessary violent action to complete the so-called socialist revolution. The original ecological existence of rural areas, relatively stable for over two thousand years, is deemed unreasonable, hindering the development of productive forces and protecting the landlord class's interests. Landlords, regardless of size, are considered antagonistic classes, reactionaries, and accomplices of the ruling authorities; they should be overthrown and eliminated.

We, however, believe such analysis contradicts facts. Under this ideology, the violent actions taken are illegal and unconstitutional. Before seizing power, during the "hooligan movement," the arbitrary plundering of landlords and rich peasants and the wanton use of torture and killing were outright banditry and frenzied looting for self-interest. After gaining power, various violent actions—inciting household-to-household struggles, village-by-village bloodshed, arbitrarily killing millions—constituted an abuse of public power and typical tyranny. Openly confiscating land and property from landlords, rich peasants, and well-off middle peasants was illegal, violating the Property Law of the People's Republic of China (《中华人民共和国物权法》). Regardless of when this law was enacted, justice resides in people's hearts. Before its promulgation, one cannot arbitrarily plunder others' property—that's no different from banditry. The wanton use of torture and killing of innocents violates criminal law. Again, regardless of when the criminal code was enacted, can one casually kill people before its promulgation? Looking back, during land reform, killing was alarmingly easy. Sometimes, the power to kill was delegated to counties or districts. Work teams would hold mass meetings to struggle against landlords, inciting the masses to shout deafening slogans, then drag the accused out for immediate execution. Executed just like that—to kill one as a warning to others. Who dared to question whether such killings were arbitrary? Was there any legal basis? What serious consequences would such indiscriminate killing bring, including the legitimacy of the rulers and the loss of public trust? At that time, people dared not think or speak. Many years later, they still remained silent, avoiding the topic. Today, if not for the internet era, my faint voice as an ordinary person would still go unheard.

Are landlords truly so evil? The situation is more complex. Let's analyze the formation of the landlord class. Landlords can roughly be divided into large, medium, and small categories, which are not fixed and can transform into each other. Generally, large landlords have official backgrounds intertwined with rulers—some even collude with them. Calling them bureaucratic landlords is appropriate. In conflicts between the government and the people, many bureaucratic landlords side with the authorities. During regime changes, they become targets—a consequence that's understandable, although violent seizure of power is unacceptable.

Apart from large landlords, there are many more medium and small landlords. Their economic strength, political status, and relationships with the government differ greatly from those of large landlords. Regarding land sources, the situation is complex and cannot be summed up as entirely derived from exploitation. Marx's famous quote—"Capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt"—doesn't fully apply to capitalists. For example, Bill Gates, the world's richest man, accumulated wealth through high-tech innovations and savvy management. Is he dirty from head to foot? China's small and medium landlords' wealth accumulation and land purchases are basically not dripping with blood and dirt. Based on various information, their situations are roughly as follows:

First, there are experts in agricultural production. Hardworking, shrewd, and resilient, some are well-educated and sensitive to economic information, adept at management, knowing what to plant and when to maximize profits, and where to buy and sell to earn the most. These medium and small landlords earn through hard work and savvy. Generally stingy and selfish, even profit-driven, they are mostly honest and understand that money doesn't come easily, so they avoid squandering. Regarding their hired laborers and tenant farmers, they do exploit but must adhere to local norms—for example, rental rates or laborers' food standards and wages. Although they desire greater profits, they know that laborers and tenants are free people who can choose their employers. Isn't there a saying: "Early winter melon, late winter melon, if I keep eating winter melon, I'll change masters!" Moreover, many laborers and tenants have kinship ties with their employers. Landlords generally avoid overstepping boundaries; being neighbors, who dares to be ruthless?

These landlords are commonly called "local rich men" or "local landlords," terms that are fitting—the word "local" here isn't derogatory; it exudes the fragrance of the soil. They are the mainstay of agriculture and primary providers of land dividends. Village ruffians and idlers, many unable to support themselves—can they contribute wealth to society?

Second, hereditary landlords. Their scale—large or small—depends on the land inherited from ancestors. Some glorify and expand the family business; others squander it—"grandsons sell grandfather's land without heartache." Generally, they guard their family heritage, becoming local gentry. Their economic strength and social status differ from the first category. They, of course, rent out land. Valuing social status and reputation over economic gains, they are essentially Confucian followers, emphasizing self-cultivation and family management. Generally, they avoid wrongdoing, adhering to "Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself." They observe certain etiquettes with their laborers and tenants. Although many literary works depict tenants and laborers suffering under abusive landlords, perhaps such cases exist but are not the norm.

Regarding the preservation of traditional culture, we cannot overlook another rural force: a group of frustrated intellectuals and retired officials at various levels (excluding high-ranking bureaucrats returning home gloriously—they remain government people, bureaucratic landlords). These intellectuals, even if dwelling in rural areas, mostly rely on land for livelihood and belong to the medium and small landlord groups. With higher cultural levels, some are scholars or hermits who "avoid chaos by returning to the countryside." They are local pride and moral exemplars. Treating villagers kindly, they continuously spread culture, arts, and crafts, earning villagers' respect. Successive rulers have regarded them differently. If treated as antagonistic classes to be overthrown, even killed or imprisoned, wouldn't that desecrate culture and greatly lose public trust?

These gentry landlords play dual roles in social development—they are stabilizing forces in rural society and potentially stubborn conservative forces, especially as many have strong patriarchal backgrounds. China's patriarchal society has a long history, traceable back over six thousand years—from female to male reproductive worship in the Neolithic period down to Confucius and Dong Zhongshu's (董仲舒) "Three Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues" (三纲五常); further to today's "princelings" and "second-generation officials." It's a significant obstacle hindering China's move toward modern civilization. To eradicate the residual poison of the patriarchal system, only the establishment of a democratic system can suffice—not the reckless actions of the "hooligan movement." Facts have proven that such actions lead only to great regression. (The author previously explored this issue in "Ma Shi Kua: Male Genital Stone Ancestor and Reproductive Worship" (《马石胯男根石祖与生殖崇拜》), published in the fourth issue of Seeking Roots (《寻根》) magazine in 1996.)

Third, landlord-merchants—some people who, after making money in business, buy land in rural areas as fixed assets; conversely, rural landlords may engage in commerce in cities for greater profits. Their scales vary, and they play crucial roles in bridging urban and rural areas, as well as industry and agriculture. They also facilitate the exchange and dissemination of technology, culture, and modern information. Some coastal cities, like Guangdong, even engage in overseas exchanges. This force cannot be underestimated. How they are treated affects the entire country.

Here, we must discuss Guangdong's so-called peaceful land reform and the Guangdong leaders Marshal Ye Jianying (叶剑英) and Fang Fang (方方), as well as how Fang Fang faced Mao's (毛) severe reprimand for overseeing land reform in Guangdong.

Guangdong is a renowned homeland for overseas Chinese, with seven million Guangdong-origin overseas Chinese—70% of the total overseas Chinese population. Before the Anti-Japanese War, remittances from overseas Chinese in Guangdong accounted for 75% of the national total, serving as China's primary source of foreign exchange. Marshal Ye Jianying, Gu Dacun (古大存), Fang Fang, and other high-ranking Guangdong Communist Party officials maintained myriad connections with overseas Chinese and their relatives in Guangdong throughout decades of revolutionary struggle. Many of these overseas Chinese purchased land in their hometowns, though it constituted a small portion of their assets. Economically, they belonged to the medium and small landlord class in rural areas. Since their primary investments were overseas, and their land purchases were managed by proxies, they couldn't have deep class contradictions with local farmers. Therefore, Ye and Fang couldn't ignore such a vast group of overseas Chinese and their relatives—a significant backdrop to Guangdong's land reform.

Beyond overseas Chinese and their relatives, Guangdong, as China's southern gateway, has long led the nation in commerce and industry. From cities to villages, commerce, and industry are highly developed. Those who prospered in business often bought rural land as a foundation; likewise, rural landlords invested in urban shops and factories, becoming proprietors. Guangdong's landlords aren't typical local landlords; they're more culturally advanced, well-informed, and dynamic thinkers. Some say Guangdong people inherently yearn for freedom, which is linked to their cultural literacy, economic status, and extensive overseas connections. Historically, Guangdong has had many wealthy individuals engaged in diversified operations—landlord-merchants are commonplace. While national land reform policies mandated protecting commerce and industry but resolutely overthrowing the landlord class, such rhetoric lacked reason and was challenging to implement—posing the greatest difficulty for Guangdong's land reform.

Ye Jianying and Fang Fang, wielding real power, couldn't abuse public authority to arbitrarily torture and kill a vast population of landlord-merchants who had contributed significantly to local development and even the revolutionary cause. They, despite believing in communism, were also influenced by modern civilization. Emotionally, morally, and even pragmatically, they couldn't commit such inhumane atrocities.

However, in an authoritarian society, local party and government officials have limited autonomy. They couldn't defy Mao's (毛) will and had to follow higher directives: vigorously promoting the greatness of land reform, dispatching work teams, mobilizing the masses, establishing grassroots organizations, classifying class status, struggling against landlords and rich peasants, confiscating their land and property, and distributing them to land-poor and landless peasants. They indeed followed procedures. The difference was that the struggles weren't excessively cruel, and some concessions were made when distributing property. Crucially, too few were killed, and too many regulations constrained the revolutionaries' zeal—inevitably causing significant trouble.

First, Mao (毛) was enraged. As Mao himself said, he wanted to hold a "royal conference" to resolve the issue. Indeed, he immediately summoned Ye Jianying, Fang Fang, and others to Beijing for the highest-level meeting. Mao said: "This is the highest meeting to discuss Guangdong's issues. 'Guangdong's land reform has lost direction.' I will beat the fast drum; Fang Fang will beat the slow drum." He continued: "(Regarding land reform) there are three turtles nationwide: Guangdong, Fujian, and Guangxi. Now Fujian and Guangxi have crawled ashore; Guangdong is still crawling."

Mao directly reproached Fang Fang: "You've made two mistakes: one is right-leaning in land reform, and the other is localism... You've done ten tasks, nine of which are good, but you haven't done land reform well. Therefore, you'll be demoted one level and sent back to Guangdong to be besieged for three days."

Fang Fang knew that Mao's words were decisive; this wasn't merely about demotion and a three-day siege. He was politically marginalized, and his political life was nearly over. Rehabilitation would only come many years after his death.

Subsequently, major Guangdong leaders like Gu Dacun and Li Jianzhen (李坚贞)—one of the 32 female Red Army soldiers who participated in the Long March—were purged under the pretext of opposing localism. With Marshal Ye Jianying transferred to Beijing, Guangdong's local cadres were essentially sidelined. Ye once said, "An incompetent commander burdens the entire army." His words, years later, still move readers.

With Gu Dacun and Fang Fang toppled, land reform in Guangdong had to proceed. Who would oversee it? Mao (毛) dispatched Tao Zhu (陶铸), a swift executor. Tao had impressed Mao by suppressing bandits and killing 40,000 people in Guangxi (one-third of whom could have been spared). Indeed, after Tao took charge of Guangdong's land reform, he unleashed a massacre, proposing "household-to-household struggles, village-by-village bloodshed," and issued quotas for executions in each county, demanding completion. From then on, Guangdong, like the northern land reforms, was drenched in blood. Tens of thousands were killed or driven to suicide, including not only large, medium, and small landlords but also those who inadequately implemented land reform policies or held dissenting views—paralleling the land reforms in Jin-Sui (晋绥) during the border region period and the nationwide land reforms at the time.

This tells us that Mao's (毛) vigorous promotion of violent land reform across China aimed not only to emulate Stalin and rapidly achieve agricultural collectivization—to further seize rural wealth—but also to purge dissent and cultivate cadres loyal to Mao. Even if they were loyal only temporarily, following him closely sufficed—until they became inconvenient, like Tao Zhu. Tao excelled at purging others during bandit suppression and land reform but eventually purged himself during the Cultural Revolution—a platform orchestrated by Mao. Mao, who issued commands and held absolute power, was indeed aptly called the "great helmsman." However, as Mencius said, "An unrighteous man in a high position is a calamity to the people" (不仁者在高位，是播恶于众也). Who fits this description better than Mao?

Returning to Guangdong's land reform, Mao's (毛) and Tao Zhu's reckless actions inflicted severe damage on Guangdong's prosperous commerce, industry, and rural areas, as well as on overseas Chinese and their relatives—leaving them devastated. As a result, during the Great Leap Forward's man-made disasters, people starved even in Guangdong's wealthy countryside. Some say that the Anti-Rightist Campaign was the cause and the Great Leap Forward was the effect. In fact, the Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine—the unprecedented catastrophe in human history—are more directly linked to violent land reform. It can be said that Mao's agricultural policies were the most egregious, cruel, and inhumane methods ever employed in history for dividing the land dividend—the big cake—causing the greatest harm to rural areas, agriculture, and farmers, and will be eternally recorded in history.

Decades later, Guangdong was revitalized by seizing the opportunities for reform and opening up—a result of the negation of Mao's erroneous theories of class struggle and the elimination of private ownership. Some say that in the early 1950s, Guangdong missed an opportunity for modernization. However, those who say this lack understanding of Mao and the essence of today's pro-Maoists. Apart from blind followers, these people, like Mao, are primarily motivated by self-interest rather than the nation's future and destiny.

China's landlord class has been completely eliminated through bloody and violent land reform and decades of relentless suppression. Even today, landlords remain the top-class enemy in numerous historical and political documents, literary and artistic works, and even in a card game called "Fighting the Landlord" (斗地主), played daily by thousands who mock and scorn them—a true case of grave sins leading to endless retribution. Among many historians and political scientists, in their writings and in the fervent chants of so-called red songs, even in the laughter during "Fighting the Landlord," how many consider that these vilified landlords are not only our compatriots but, in this agrarian nation, were primarily responsible for sustaining our people and country through millennia of diligent toil? Today, rather than showing gratitude, we harm and slander them—isn't this forgetting our roots? Our "ancestors" aren't just a few famous figures or emperors and generals but countless hardworking people throughout history, including the vast majority of small and medium landlords.

When will the true face of history be restored?

The first draft was completed in early December 2012

The third draft was completed in February 2013