The Chinese Conundrum Roosevelt Created at Yalta ---Determining the Ethics and Politics of U.S. Presidential Foreign Policy (II)
罗斯福在雅尔塔制造的中国难题---决定美国总统外交政策的伦理与政治（二）
By Rong Jian (荣剑)
Roosevelt (罗斯福) Created the Chinese Conundrum at Yalta (雅尔塔)
【Editor’s Note: Rong Jian’s Determining the Ethics and Politics of U.S. Presidential Foreign Policy (II)—The Chinese Conundrum Roosevelt Created at Yalta explores Franklin D. Roosevelt’s evolving foreign policy, particularly its impact on China during and after World War II. The article traces Roosevelt’s commitment to Wilsonian ideals—promoting international law, democracy, and global governance—while navigating realpolitik constraints. Initially, Roosevelt viewed China as a key ally, securing its place among the “Four Great Powers” at the Cairo Conference (1943). However, by the Yalta Conference (1945), China was excluded from negotiations, and secret agreements were made between the U.S., U.K., and Soviet Union that significantly compromised China’s sovereignty—allowing Soviet military intervention in Manchuria and recognizing Outer Mongolia’s independence. Roosevelt’s belief in Soviet cooperation and a democratic transition in China ultimately proved misguided. The Stilwell Incident damaged U.S.-China relations, and postwar Soviet actions facilitated Communist expansion in China, leading to civil war. The article argues that Roosevelt, despite winning the war, failed to secure peace for China, as his policies unintentionally accelerated the Communist victory. The Yalta agreements exemplified the limitations of Roosevelt’s idealism and the ethical dilemmas faced by U.S. presidents in foreign policy decision-making.】
Joseph Nye (约瑟夫·奈), in his book American Presidents and Their Foreign Policy (《美国总统及其外交政策》), poses a critical question: “How should we judge the ethics of U.S. presidents in their foreign policies? American presidents have their own values and beliefs, yet they are also leaders in a real world of non-perfectionist ethics, which Max Weber (马克斯·韦伯) described.”¹ In other words, whether U.S. presidents make the best moral choices under particular circumstances does not depend solely on their inherent values and convictions. Rather, they draw upon the three ethical dimensions Joseph Nye outlines—realism, liberalism, and globalism—for inspiration and wisdom. Therefore, no matter how profoundly U.S. presidential foreign policy might be imbued with liberal moral overtones, it is ultimately constrained by the real-world relationship between the United States and the rest of the globe. While presenting American values to the world, the president must also consider how to work through global political frameworks to achieve the greatest possibility for realizing those values.
From a realist perspective, despite the broad, cross-class, cross-party, and transnational enthusiasm in Europe for the moral vision of world order that Wilsonianism (威尔逊主义) proposed after World War I, it ultimately failed in practice. The two objectives Wilson (威尔逊) sought to establish—tempering the anarchy of international relations through binding international law and organizations and steering states within the system toward constitutional democracy—remained unfulfilled. The forces opposed to Wilsonianism were mainly Republicans in the United States, whose control of the U.S. Senate led to the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and Wilson’s proposal for a League of Nations. As Perry Anderson (佩里·安德森) summarized: “America did not need to fulfill Wilson’s grand ambitions; it was not prepared for endless, regenerative interventions in global affairs.”² In 1920, at the end of Wilson’s term, Republicans took office, and during their twelve years of leadership, U.S. foreign policy reverted to 19th-century isolationism. Public opinion held that America’s involvement in World War I and its efforts to create a new world order had been a profound mistake. It was not until Franklin D. Roosevelt (富兰克林·罗斯福) and the Democratic Party’s victory in 1933 that Wilsonianism welcomed its true heir. Robert Dallek (罗伯特·达莱克), a professor of American history, noted this in his examination of Roosevelt’s foreign policy, stressing that Roosevelt, “the strongest advocate of Wilsonianism in the 1920s,” recognized its decline at the time but believed that Americans would eventually return to their progressive ideals; once they did, he would be in a strong position to secure their support.³ It was precisely this unwavering faith in Wilsonianism that enabled Roosevelt to wrest the presidency from the Republicans.
In Roosevelt’s first presidential term, diplomacy was not his primary concern; he urgently needed to address the catastrophic impact of the Great Depression on the United States. His “New Deal” focused on a series of domestic issues. When, in his second term, Roosevelt began to face the world and shape U.S. foreign policy during World War II, he had to contend with powerful isolationist sentiment at home while confronting the greatest international challenge since World War I: the rise of Nazi Germany, which swiftly toppled the balance of power in Europe, and Japan’s invasion of China, which forced the United States to stake out a clear position on the Far East. From his first day in office, Roosevelt firmly believed that using Wilsonianism to handle international affairs should remain the core principle of American foreign policy: “The sanctity of treaties must be maintained as the foundation upon which all international relations are built.”⁴ Thus, when Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, the President quickly responded and addressed the American public:
“I believe we have every right and sufficient reason to make it our national policy to uphold the basic moral codes, religious teachings, and relentless efforts to maintain peace—because one day, though it may be far off, we will be able to make a greater contribution to a humanity on the brink of collapse.”
“In the realm of contemporary international relations, one must begin with a simple yet timeless fact: if peace is shattered anywhere, the peace of all nations everywhere is endangered.”
“I cannot foresee the direct economic effects of this new war on our country, but I can indeed say that no American has the moral right to reap profits at the expense of his fellow citizens or at the expense of men, women, and children alive or dead in Europe’s war.”
“Most of us in the United States believe in spiritual values. Most of us adhere to New Testament teachings—a great doctrine that opposes violence, armed force, expeditionary troops, and bombing for our own gain. The vast majority of us yearn for peace—domestic peace and also peace abroad that does not threaten our domestic tranquility.”
“We have a clear conviction and ideal of national security, and today we must take action to safeguard that security and ensure that our children enjoy it in the years to come.”⁵
Yet Roosevelt’s Wilsonian moral appeal did not immediately awaken a public still slumbering in the confines of isolationism. The U.S. Congress had passed the Neutrality Acts of 1935, which aimed to keep the United States out of European and Asian conflicts. Gallup polls in 1936 and 1937 showed that 70 percent of Americans believed it was a mistake to have entered World War I. By 1940, fewer than 10 percent thought American troops should be deployed overseas. Even in 1941, that figure rose only to 23 percent, with the majority still rejecting the notion that Nazi Germany posed a threat to the United States.⁶ This was unprecedented in American history: while the President called on the people to join the anti-fascist coalition, he looked behind him and saw no one following. Consequently, he had to implement military and diplomatic policies supportive of the Allies in the narrow space allowed by presidential authority and legal constraints—such as using the Lend-Lease Act to send substantial military assistance to Britain. The Pearl Harbor attack enabled Roosevelt to complete the historic shift in American foreign policy: on December 9, 1942, on behalf of the U.S. government, he officially declared war on Japan and the Axis powers. Under his leadership, the United States finally abandoned isolationism and became a pillar of the global antifascist struggle.
America’s declaration of war on Japan gave Sino-American relations unprecedented strategic significance. Since the outbreak of full-scale war between China and Japan in 1937, the United States had moved away from its previous policy of mere moral condemnation of Japan, coupled with non-intervention, to imposing tougher sanctions, demanding the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, and refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the puppet state “Manchukuo.” Roosevelt’s administration also took upon itself the task of educating the American public about the perils of non-involvement in China and emphasized the importance of safeguarding equal commercial opportunity and maintaining China’s territorial integrity. The outbreak of the Pacific War was largely triggered by Japan’s refusal to accept Secretary of State Hull (赫尔)’s ultimatum⁷—demanding Japan withdraw from China and French Indochina—and by its inability to withstand U.S. economic sanctions, particularly the oil embargo. Roosevelt explicitly stated, “We are in this war, not for conquest or revenge, but to rebuild a new world.”⁸ Assuming this historic mission, he not only focused on mobilizing the vast American war machine to annihilate the enemy but also returned to the two Wilsonian ideals—establishing an international organization akin to the League of Nations and promoting constitutional governance worldwide—to reconstruct the postwar order and ensure permanent peace through the power of democracy.
From November 23 to 26, 1943, the United States, Britain, and China convened the Cairo Conference (开罗会议) to discuss strategy for defeating Japan and to plan the postwar international order, including Allied cooperation in retaking Burma and assisting China. The resulting Cairo Declaration demanded Japan’s unconditional surrender and the return of all seized territories. It also laid out a new postwar arrangement in East Asia based on fairness and justice. One major outcome of the conference was Roosevelt’s proposal to designate China as one of the world’s “Four Great Powers,” granting it a political role and status in the postwar global order equivalent to that of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union.⁹ This decision reflected both Roosevelt’s strategic assessment of the critical role China played in the Pacific War—with Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石) leading Chinese troops in full-scale conflict against Japan and tying down nearly two million Japanese soldiers—and Roosevelt’s Wilsonian conviction that China, under Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government, would adopt a constitutional form of governance and transform itself into a democracy akin to the United States. For the first time in Sino-American relations, the United States did not simply cast itself as China’s savior; rather, it envisioned China as a pivotal force shaping the new postwar world. By placing China front and center in Cairo, Roosevelt’s China policy showcased both his idealistic outlook and its real-world significance. He spoke highly of Chiang Kai-shek’s qualities: “He is a farsighted, fearless man with unique insight into present and future issues.” He also looked forward to collaboration among the “Four Great Powers”: “Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States, along with other Allied nations, represent more than three-quarters of the world’s population. If these four militarily powerful countries stand united in preserving world peace, no nation will be able to instigate another world war.”¹⁰
The Cairo Conference had tremendous significance for China. Chiang Kai-shek regarded it as a major achievement in his lifelong “revolutionary endeavors,” calling it an “unprecedented diplomatic triumph in Chinese history.” For the first time in more than a century, a Chinese leader negotiated as an equal with the leaders of Western powers. Chiang Kai-shek credited his wife, Soong Mei-ling (宋美龄), whose February 18, 1943 speech before the U.S. Congress—delivered with charisma and passion—captivated its members. Every American radio station rushed to broadcast it, every newspaper ran her remarks on the front page, and major magazines like Time (《时代周刊》) and Newsweek (《新闻周刊》) featured her on their covers. This “Madame Diplomacy” introduced the American public to an image of China making enormous sacrifices and contributions to the global fight against fascism. Her visit to the United States helped solidify China’s position as a world power in Cairo. Under Roosevelt’s leadership, with Madame Chiang’s energetic efforts, Sino-American relations reached the highest point in nearly a century at the Cairo Conference.
Yet the political momentum of China’s unprecedented diplomatic triumph at the Cairo Conference proved short-lived. In December 1943, the United States agreed to Britain’s request to prioritize the European front, thereby canceling the previously planned offensive in Burma. This was seen as a turning point in America’s policy toward China, shifting from a proactive strategy of “keeping China in the war” in the early stages of the Pacific War to a more passive one. China’s importance began to wane dramatically in Roosevelt’s eyes, primarily because he also started to reassess Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership. Two concerns emerged: first, whether Chiang could hold the line if Japan launched a new offensive—if not, Roosevelt considered supporting someone else in his stead, as recorded by Stilwell (史迪威): “If Chiang fails, back others.”¹¹ Second, whether Chiang could fulfill the democratic reforms Roosevelt had expected and work with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to form a coalition government. Chiang repeatedly tried to persuade Roosevelt not to support the Communists. However, Roosevelt did not view the CCP as a monstrous threat but rather as a group that might be unified and reformed. Next came the “Stilwell Incident (史迪威事件),” which irreversibly damaged Roosevelt’s personal relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. Roosevelt had hoped to modernize the Chinese armed forces and prompt the Nationalist Government toward democratic reforms by giving General Stilwell actual command of the China theater. This plan fatally undermined Chiang’s authority. Unable to carry it out, Roosevelt was forced to recall Stilwell under pressure from Chiang. The fiasco ended Roosevelt’s attempt to exert control in China through Stilwell, thus compelling a recalibration of U.S.-China policy. Its new focus shifted from military support of the Nationalist Government to advancing political reforms aimed at establishing a coalition government. Robert Dallek highlights Roosevelt’s chief concerns about China at this stage:
“Roosevelt decided to accommodate Chiang Kai-shek mostly out of political, not military, considerations. He believed that confronting Chiang directly over the Stilwell appointment would accelerate Chiang’s downfall. Toppling the Chinese government would destroy everything he had done to promote China’s emergence as an independent, sovereign country. It could also irreversibly shatter his shaky plan to elevate an allied China onto the global stage. … By now, Roosevelt’s chief concern in China was the conclusion of a Nationalist-Communist accord so as to prevent a civil war that would undermine his postwar plans. Civil war would wreck any hope of aligning China with the United States in international affairs and might produce a pro-Soviet regime, handing the Soviet Union control of Manchuria and seriously challenging postwar U.S.-Soviet collaboration.”¹²
Clearly, despite Roosevelt’s substantial focus on China, he was looking at Chinese affairs largely through the prism of U.S.-Soviet relations because the Soviet Union was undoubtedly the decisive factor in shaping wartime developments and redrawing the postwar political map. Roosevelt believed that if he managed U.S.-Soviet relations properly, China’s myriad issues could be resolved. From February 4 to 11, 1945, the “Big Three”—President Roosevelt of the United States, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars Joseph Stalin (斯大林) of the Soviet Union, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill (丘吉尔) of the United Kingdom—met at the Livadia Palace in the Crimean Peninsula for the Yalta Conference (雅尔塔会议). They discussed the blueprint for the postwar global order and the allocation of major powers’ interests and spheres of influence. Key issues on the agenda included dealing with Germany, Poland, the Far East, and the establishment of the United Nations. The postwar framework shaped at Yalta had far-reaching consequences for the world. Notably absent was the Chinese leader, who had been recognized at Cairo as the head of one of the “Four Great Powers.” Roosevelt no longer pressed for Chiang Kai-shek to secure his seat among the global powers. The result was that Chiang was shut out of any negotiations, unable to defend China’s core interests at a critical juncture. During the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt attempted to speak up for China, objecting to concessions at China’s expense in order to appease the Soviet Union. In the end, though, the secret agreement (kept hidden from China) reached regarding the Far East severely infringed on Chinese sovereignty and interests: (1) the Soviet Army would enter Northeast China; (2) Outer Mongolia’s status as an independent entity would be maintained; (3) Soviet rights in Northeast China would be reinstated, including internationalization of Dalian Port, Soviet lease of Lüshun (Port Arthur) as a naval base, and joint Sino-Soviet administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
In June 1945—four months after the Yalta Conference—U.S. Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew (约瑟夫·克拉克·格鲁) presented the terms of the secret agreement to Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong (宋子文), informing him that the U.S. government had pledged to support the “conditions set forth” in the agreement. Soong responded: “The issue is precisely what you have agreed to support,” pointing out that Molotov (莫洛托夫) had added wording that gave the Soviet Union a legal pretext for extracting any concessions it pleased from China.¹³ Even at this point, the United States still had not delivered the original version of the agreement to the Chinese government. Only after mounting pressure from China did Roosevelt share partial records of the secret deal with China’s Ambassador to the U.S., Wei Tao-ming (魏道明). Upon reading the ambassador’s report, Chiang Kai-shek felt “pain and anger,” writing in his diary: “Has Yalta indeed sold out China? … In that case, our hopes in this war against Japan may prove a mere illusion.”¹⁴ What he found most intolerable was that Americans and the British presumed they had the right to cede Chinese sovereignty to the Soviet Union, an affront to both him and China.¹⁵
For the U.S. government—from President Roosevelt to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius (斯退丁纽斯) and onward to General George C. Marshall (马歇尔将军)—the Yalta Conference represented America’s first great triumph in achieving peace. Departing Yalta, Roosevelt cabled Stalin, declaring, “We have reached far-reaching decisions at Yalta that will speed our victory and lay a solid foundation for permanent peace.” Harry Hopkins (霍普金斯), one of Roosevelt’s key advisors, was convinced that “a new utopia has arrived … the Soviets have shown they are willing to heed reason, and the President is confident he ‘can coexist peacefully with them.’” Stettinius wrote in his memoirs that “from the record of the conference, it is evident that Soviet concessions at Yalta to the United States and Britain far exceeded anything conceded to the Soviet Union.” The U.S. military was especially pleased with the outcome, as the Soviet Union’s commitment to entering the war against Japan was now certain. Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (威廉·丹尼尔·莱希) and General George Catlett Marshall (乔治·卡特利特·马歇尔) both stated it was “well worth the trip,” believing the Red Army’s offensive in Northeast China would save hundreds of thousands of American lives. Charles Bohlen (查尔斯·波伦), Roosevelt’s Russian interpreter, remarked: “All in all, upon leaving Yalta, we were hopeful about sincere postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union on political matters.”¹⁶ The Soviets were equally satisfied with the conference. Stalin’s reputation in the West peaked at Yalta; Time (《时代周刊》) featured him on its cover on February 5, 1945. The Soviets were surprised that Roosevelt had initiated “secret deals” to secure their involvement against Japan, offering territory formerly under Japanese control, a sphere of influence in Northeast China, and recognition of Outer Mongolia’s continued independence, all in exchange for Soviet engagement. Stalin sought to reassure Roosevelt, agreeing to back Chiang Kai-shek over the Chinese Communist Party after the war. Projecting a “hidden genius” aura, Stalin appeared kind and humorous, promising Roosevelt: “Allies should not deceive one another.” Roosevelt believed him wholeheartedly.
According to Jay Taylor (陶涵), near the end of his life, Roosevelt—spurred by Patrick Hurley (赫尔利)—became aware that the Yalta agreement severely conflicted with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter (《大西洋宪章》), which held that territorial adjustments had to reflect the will of the peoples concerned. “Roosevelt’s sense of guilt was stirred,” and “Roosevelt and other top officials in Washington indeed began rethinking the overall relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.” Even so, Roosevelt still trusted Hurley, affirming that the core of U.S. China policy was to support Chiang Kai-shek, though he also cautioned Hurley, “Please be as tolerant [toward the CCP] as you can. Speak kindly… Don’t destroy the foundation that could lead to peaceful unification by the armed forces.”¹⁷ Roosevelt never relinquished his belief that the Soviet Union was prepared—perhaps even eager—to act as a “normal country” in postwar global cooperation rather than as a revolutionary force bent on building an ideological empire. Nor did he abandon hope that the CCP could potentially democratize and join the Nationalists in a coalition government, jointly steering China toward a new phase of peace, democracy, and unity after the war. As subsequent events would show, the Yalta agreement—especially the secret deal on China’s sovereignty made without China’s involvement—created a conundrum that Roosevelt’s administration was powerless to resolve. Once the Soviet Army advanced into and occupied Northeast China, communism inevitably spread widely in the country, replaying a Wilsonian outcome reminiscent of the post–World War I scenario: winning the war but losing the peace.
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Rong Jian (荣剑): Determining the Ethics and Politics of U.S. Presidential Foreign Policy (I)
Notes for This Article:
Joseph Nye (约瑟夫·奈), American Presidents and Their Foreign Policy (《美国总统及其外交政策》), p. 40.
Perry Anderson (佩里·安德森), American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers (《美国外交政策及其智囊》), pp. 8–9.
Robert Dallek (罗伯特·达莱克), Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (《罗斯福与美国对外政策：1932—1945》), Vol. 1, translated by Yi Wei (伊伟) et al., edited by Bai Ziran (白自然), The Commercial Press, 1984, p. 18.
Cited in Ibid., p. 39.
Franklin D. Roosevelt (富兰克林·罗斯福), Fireside Chats (《炉边谈话》), translated by Zhao Yue (赵越) and Kong Mi (孔谧), China Renmin University Press, 2017, pp. 139–142.
See Joseph Nye (约瑟夫·奈), American Presidents and Their Foreign Policy (《美国总统及其外交政策》), p. 55.
On November 26, 1941, with the approval of President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull delivered a strongly worded memorandum (known as the “Hull Note”) to the Japanese Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō (野村吉三郎). Its main demands included the withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China and French Indochina; joint recognition by the United States and Japan of the Nationalist Government in Chongqing, with no support for any other regime; and conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression pact among the U.S., Britain, Japan, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Thailand, thus reinstating the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty (《九国公约》) and replacing the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Ambassador Nomura immediately deemed the memorandum unacceptable. Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki (东条英机) called it America’s final ultimatum to Japan. Some Japanese scholars contend that regardless of the Hull Note, Japan had already reached a consensus at a joint Imperial Conference on November 27 to launch war on the United States on December 8 without a formal declaration. See Furukawa Takahisa (古川隆久), Destruction and Rebirth: Japan’s Shōwa Era (1926–1989) (《毁灭与重生：日本昭和时代（1926—1989）》), translated by Zhang Lin (章霖), Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 2021, p. 140.
Franklin D. Roosevelt (富兰克林·罗斯福), Fireside Chats (《炉边谈话》), p. 204.
Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石) was invited to the Cairo Conference (开罗会议) at President Roosevelt’s insistence. Stalin refused to meet Chiang, worried about provoking Japan, and Churchill secretly looked down on him. Undeterred by Soviet and British opposition, Roosevelt insisted on Chiang’s attendance and on recognizing China as one of the “Four Great Powers.” Partly, this stemmed from Roosevelt’s Far East strategy, which acknowledged the significance of China’s battlefield in the broader Pacific War; partly, it reflected the special sentiment he felt toward China, the Wilsonian moral responsibility. See Robert Dallek (罗伯特·达莱克), Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (《罗斯福与美国对外政策：1932—1945》), Vol. 2, translated by Chen Qidi (陈启迪) et al., edited by Bai Ziran (白自然) and Ma Qinghuai (马清槐), The Commercial Press, 1984, p. 600.
Ibid., pp. 284, 286.
See Jay Taylor (陶涵), Chiang Kai-shek and Modern China (《蒋介石与现代中国》), p. 190.
Robert Dallek (罗伯特·达莱克), Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (《罗斯福与美国对外政策：1932—1945》), Vol. 2, pp. 710–711.
See Serhii Plokhy (沙希利·浦洛基), Yalta: The Eight Days That Changed the World (《雅尔塔：改变世界的八天》), translated by Lin Tiangui (林添贵), CITIC Press, 2018, p. 370.
Cited in Jay Taylor (陶涵), Chiang Kai-shek and Modern China (《蒋介石与现代中国》), p. 278.
Research by Deng Ye (邓野) shows that in August 1943, Chiang Kai-shek proposed a plan for a Pacific War Conference comprising the United States, Britain, and China—excluding the Soviet Union. Yet at Yalta, the Soviet Union agreed to enter the war against Japan, while Chiang was excluded. If Chiang’s plan had been realized, the postwar geopolitical order in the Far East would have been entirely different. See Deng Ye (邓野), United Government and One-Party Tutelage: KMT-CCP Political Struggle from 1944 to 1946 (《联合政府与一党训政：1944—1946年间国共政争》), Social Sciences Academic Press, 2011, p. 121.
Serhii Plokhy (沙希利·浦洛基), Yalta: The Eight Days That Changed the World (《雅尔塔：改变世界的八天》), pp. 429, 420.
Ibid., p. 278.
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This translation is an independent yet well-intentioned effort by the China Thought Express editorial team to bridge ideas between the Chinese and English-speaking worlds.