The Insights from Re-reading Li Zhisui's "The Private Life of Chairman Mao"

By JIN Zhe (金哲)

【Editor’’s Note: Thirty years after its publication, Li Zhisui's The Private Life of Chairman Mao has gained renewed relevance in understanding China's current leader, Xi Jinping. The book, which revealed the hidden side of Mao Zedong, is now seen as a crucial reference for analyzing Xi's emulation of Mao's authoritarian style. Scholar Hu Ping notes that Li's unique perspective confirms and deepens prior perceptions of Mao, particularly his intolerance of criticism and the resulting political purges. Professor Perry Link observes that while Xi consciously imitates Mao's superficial tactics, societal changes like the internet make full replication impossible. Political scientist Andrew Nathan highlights the psychological issues stemming from centralized power, such as the lack of trusted successors due to fear of being overthrown—a trait shared by both leaders. The article suggests that understanding Mao's dictatorship through Li's memoir provides valuable insights into Xi's governance and that passive resistance among the populace may eventually lead to change.】

Thirty years ago, in 1994, Li Zhisui, the physician to former Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong, published The Private Life of Chairman Mao (《毛泽东私人医生回忆录》) in the United States. The book unveiled a hidden and unknown side of Mao, garnering global attention at the time. Back then, both in China and worldwide, there was a widespread consensus that China and the Chinese Communist Party were unlikely to see another dictator like Mao in the future. However, less than two decades later, China's current leader, Xi Jinping, is exhibiting a posture that not only emulates Mao but even surpasses him. Thus, The Private Life of Chairman Mao has gained a significance that was not apparent when it was first published—it provides an important and intriguing reference for understanding Xi Jinping, who openly declares his intention to emulate Mao.

First Impressions of "The Private Life of Chairman Mao"

In 1994, Random House published Dr. Li Zhisui's memoir The Private Life of Chairman Mao (《毛泽东私人医生回忆录》), chronicling his more than 20 years working alongside Mao Zedong. The Chinese edition bears the same title. Scholar Hu Ping, then editor-in-chief of the political journal Beijing Spring (《北京之春》), has long studied philosophy and Chinese politics and is well-versed in related literature. Hu recalls his feelings upon first reading The Private Life of Chairman Mao:

"My first impression was that this book is unique. It offers us an unparalleled perspective, allowing us to see a side of Mao Zedong that others have not seen. This enriches and deepens our understanding of Mao and confirms some of our perceptions. For example, Li Zhisui writes in his memoir that, in hindsight, if the criticisms from democrats at the time hadn't involved Mao, the Cultural Revolution would have occurred ten years earlier, in 1957 rather than in 1966.

"This insight coincides with my own. I also believe that when Mao initiated the Rectification Movement in 1957, calling on people to offer suggestions to the [Chinese Communist] Party, he didn't initially plan to 'set a long line to catch big fish' or 'lure the snake out of its hole'; instead, he misjudged the situation. He expected people to respond to the Great Leader's call by criticizing officials at all levels and upholding his absolute authority, much like during the Cultural Revolution.

"Unexpectedly, once the Rectification began, criticisms flooded in—not only against officials at all levels but also including him, the 'old monk.' He couldn't tolerate this and turned hostile, launching the Anti-Rightist Campaign and transforming the Rectification into a crackdown on dissent. In this regard, Dr. Li's book provides us with important facts that others couldn't have known. As his physician, Li noticed that in mid-May 1957, just as Mao was turning the Rectification into the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Mao was in a bad mood, lying in bed all day, mentally depressed, and had caught a cold, calling Li back to attend to him. Mao's sleep became even more irregular.

"Li's unique observational angle—from Mao's physical and emotional state at the time—gives us insight into the real situation behind Mao's Anti-Rightist Campaign. This is the unique value of this book."

Speaking of Xi Jinping's declared and strenuous efforts to emulate Mao Zedong, Professor Perry Link (林培瑞) of Chinese Literature and Language at the University of California, Riverside, offers his perspective:

"Xi Jinping certainly wants to be another Mao Zedong. He doesn't have much other knowledge or resources; his educational and cultural level isn't high, and he hasn't traveled abroad. So when he came to power, he felt, 'I need to do something,' and he had a kind of anxiety. Then, his only source of knowledge and resources was to return to Mao. I think he consciously chose to imitate him.

"Of course, he imitates in many superficial ways, even by shouting slogans. I recall that in 1967, Lin Biao urged the Chinese nationwide to read Chairman Mao's books, listen to Chairman Mao's words, and act according to Chairman Mao's instructions. Then, about two or three years ago, I noticed that Xi Jinping used exactly the same wording, just replacing 'Chairman Mao' with 'Chairman Xi.'

"So, on this level, he can certainly imitate Mao Zedong. However, to more profoundly reenact the atmosphere and society of Mao's era is an entirely different matter; I think it's quite different. Of course, what's similar is that many ordinary people have excessive enthusiasm for extreme communism or nationalism—this is similar among young people. But on a deeper level, I think it's pretty different because now we have the internet. Of course, the Communist Party also controls the internet, but nevertheless, after society had the internet, it was very different from Mao's time. In Mao's era, the common people were isolated; they could only consider themselves. They didn't know that others shared the same thoughts—they had ideas but didn't know others had them, so there was a solitary atmosphere. Now, with the internet, there are many collective thoughts, including a spontaneous consciousness that can be said to come from the bottom up. The common people now are quite different from those under Chairman Mao.

"So, can Xi Jinping become a little Mao Zedong? I think it's very difficult. First, society is so different; second, he himself isn't as cunning as Mao. Both are cunning in their ways, but Mao was more capable. Mao was a very unique individual. Aside from Xi Jinping's scheming abilities, he doesn't have Mao's intellect."

The Court Politics of Mao's Era and Xi's Era

Professor Andrew Nathan (黎安友) of political science at Columbia University has long studied modern Chinese politics. He was involved throughout the publication of Dr. Li's book.

When The Private Life of Chairman Mao was officially published, Nathan wrote a preface, noting that the book is unique in world history because, throughout the ages, we have never seen a long-term companion of a dictatorial tyrant write such a detailed account of the tyrant's daily life and behavior—details that are usually kept secret from the public.

In the preface, Nathan wrote: "Psychopathology spread within the atmosphere of Mao's court politics; the more thoroughly Mao controlled others, the more he feared others trying to control him. Their painstaking efforts to please him only made him find them more suspicious." In Nathan's view, the court politics under Xi Jinping today is even more intense than under Mao.

Nathan says: "When someone holds so much power, it can lead to various psychological issues. Mao's own psychological problem was that if he designated a successor, he feared that the successor might be eager to replace him. So, during Mao's era, Liu Shaoqi was first his successor, but Mao later brought him down. Then there was Lin Biao. Until now, Xi Jinping has avoided this issue, so he doesn't have a successor. The reason he doesn't have one might be due to fear.

"If there were a successor, those opposing him might rally around the successor, potentially causing his downfall. So, this psychological (pathological) issue exists."

Hu Ping believes that the court politics in Xi Jinping's era is even more perilous than in Mao's time; this is an obvious fact.

He says: "Without a doubt, the state of court politics in China still exists and can be said to be more severe than before. Think about it: Since Mao came to power in 1949, he launched various campaigns, including the later Lushan Conference and the Cultural Revolution, purging batch after batch of officials at all levels, including his own designated successors. His power became increasingly centralized and vast.

"But at the same time, he felt increasingly insecure because the more enemies he purged, the more people he overthrew, the more enemies he created for himself. Thus, he increasingly felt that no one around him could be trusted, and everyone wanted to harm him. He fell into this kind of fear and pathology.

"Xi Jinping's situation is similar. Since coming to power, Xi has carried out a massive purge under the banner of anti-corruption, successively purging high-level Party members, including Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, and a series of other senior figures. In the ten years since he took office, the number of high-ranking Chinese officials he has purged, especially military generals, is unprecedented.

"Under such circumstances, how can you expect Xi Jinping to feel secure? Especially after the 20th Party Congress, the people around him are supposedly all his own appointees. If you talk about factions loyal to Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao, those like Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong were already purged earlier. Yet, Xi continues to purge batch after batch. Back then, although Mao didn't trust many people, he at least never doubted the loyalty of people like Wang Dongxing around him. But look at Xi Jinping now: even with the so-called Central Guard Regiment—now called the Central Guard Bureau—he doesn't trust these people, replacing one after another. Some have even died under mysterious circumstances."

What Is the Significance of Li Zhisui's Book in Understanding Today's China?

In The Private Life of Chairman Mao, Dr. Li Zhisui recounts many of Mao's chilling, undisclosed words and deeds. Among these, which aspects are most educational for the world's understanding of today's China and its ruler, Xi Jinping? As a political science professor, Andrew Nathan's view is:

"There may be two aspects. On one hand, if power is overly centralized, does that mean people dare to speak the truth, or are they afraid to? Although a democratic system has many problems, one prominent issue is about the truth—because in many areas, in politics, in opposition parties, and in the media, many people dare to speak the truth. However, in an authoritarian regime, if no one dares to speak the truth, the leader lacks reliable information to make policy decisions.

"Another aspect is also very interesting—the relationship between political power and life. I mean, if someone holds a lot of power in their hands, will they abuse that power, treating others as tools? Mao was like this. In his personal life, he also showed that his overall attitude towards others was to treat them as tools, not as independent beings of value."

Hu Ping believes that reading Li Zhisui's book and understanding the Mao era is of great significance for understanding the Xi Jinping era. He says:

"Li Zhisui recounts many things. Among them, he mentions that if at the early stage of the Great Leap Forward, Mao had known the truth of the situation, he might have been willing to stop that great disaster, the famine. Of course, if Mao had known that the Great Leap Forward did not result in a bumper harvest, not yields of over ten thousand catties per mu, although he was a dictatorial tyrant, subjectively, he didn't want the Chinese people to die.

"But here's the problem. His high-pressure rule itself created a system of lies, and he himself was surrounded by lies. When he discovered problems, correcting others would become very serious because correcting mistakes directly threatened his own authority. Thus, the tyrant would rather let the mistake continue to the end.

"We know there's such an example in Romance of the Three Kingdoms (《三国演义》). Yuan Shao was self-opinionated; during the Battle of Guandu, he didn't listen to the strategist Tian Feng's advice and even imprisoned Tian Feng. Later, he was indeed defeated by Cao Cao. When news of the defeat came, the jailer told Tian Feng: 'You see, our lord didn't listen to you and lost the battle; now you might be reinstated.' Tian Feng said, 'No, if the lord had won, I might have survived; since he lost, I will surely die.' As expected, Yuan Shao returned and killed Tian Feng. Mao Zedong was in a similar situation. He launched the Great Leap Forward, People's Communes, and communal canteens; by the second half of 1958 and the first half of 1959, severe famine had already appeared, and people were starving to death.

"But he didn't like people who told the truth. When he found that correcting a mistake might undermine his authority, he wouldn't correct it but insisted on the mistake even more severely. I think this is a significant characteristic of communist despotism. This is vividly revealed in your book and provides considerable enlightenment for understanding Xi Jinping's rule."

What Else Can Be Done Besides "Lying Flat" in Despair and Helplessness?

Today, in China, the concept of "lying flat" (躺平) is prevalent, and many people have chosen to lie flat. This seems to indicate that many Chinese feel both despair and helplessness toward Xi Jinping's rule, much like the end of Mao Zedong's reign, as depicted in Li Zhisui's book. This situation makes many wonders: in facing such despair and helplessness, besides choosing to escape or to curse, is there a better way for Chinese people?

When asked this question, Professor Andrew Nathan, who studies contemporary Chinese politics at Columbia University, said:

"As a foreigner, it's not appropriate for me to give Chinese people any advice. But let's look at the 1989 pro-democracy movement, the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European communist regimes, or recent events in Venezuela and Bangladesh. There's a lesson: if the psychology of many people reaches a certain point, sooner or later, a crisis will occur. If people can no longer endure, an internal crisis will eventually happen; people will come out to oppose the authorities sooner or later.

"At the same time, we don't know when such a situation will occur. So, before that time comes, what attitude should one adopt? One is to live as much as possible in truth, like Liu Xiaobo or former Czech President Václav Havel—to live according to reality as much as possible, not deceiving oneself. My own view is that I probably am not qualified to tell Chinese people how to live."

Scholar Hu Ping believes that although today's Chinese politics leaves many feeling helpless, there is still some space between the current situation and despair. He says:

"Lying flat itself is a form of resistance. When the public generally feels disgusted and expresses rejection but lacks the strength to carry out direct, active resistance, people adopt this so-called 'lying flat' method, or what is called 'go slow' (deliberate inefficiency). In Mao's era, we saw this form of resistance. Academically, there's a term for this—' the resistance of the weak.'

"Moreover, now is different from the past. Previously, under complete public ownership and a planned economy, ordinary workers, peasants, and soldiers had no opportunity to strive even if they wanted to because no matter how hard they tried, they couldn't improve their situation. Now, China has a certain space for private enterprises. In this aspect, in some sectors, many people need to work harder just to improve their own livelihood. Therefore, the degree and prevalence of 'go slow' now differs from the late Mao era.

"This situation, this state, this 'go slow,' is actually continuing to accumulate dissatisfaction. It will eventually find its own outlet."

Since its publication 30 years ago, Li Zhisui's The Private Life of Chairman Mao has become a classic document for studying Mao Zedong and the Mao era. However, in China, this book—which helps to understand the past of the Chinese Communist regime and recognize the present—has always been banned.

Source: Voice of America, October 27, 2024.