The Lies of Dazhai

By Netizen

【Editor’s Note: Dazhai (大寨), a village in Shanxi Province, became a national symbol under Mao Zedong’s "Learn from Dazhai" campaign in the 1960s, with its leader, Chen Yonggui, rising to Vice Premier. However, Dazhai’s success was largely political, not agricultural. During a 1978 tour, delegates found that Dazhai’s crops were poorly grown, with resources channeled selectively. Vice Minister of Agriculture Yang Xiandong exposed Dazhai’s fabrications in 1979, revealing the falsified crop yields and persecution of locals during the Cultural Revolution. Despite Dazhai’s shortcomings, Mao’s support shielded it from earlier scrutiny. By 1980, Chen resigned, and Dazhai's falsity was publicly criticized. Xiyang County, where Dazhai is located, experienced numerous wrongful persecutions, but efforts to correct these injustices began in 1979. The "Learn from Dazhai" movement ultimately stifled China’s agricultural development. Chen Yonggui died in 1986, with only Hua Guofeng attending his funeral.】

Dazhai's rise and fall and its figurehead, Chen Yonggui (陈永贵), were products of politics, emblematic of the success and downfall tied to political tides. The lesson is simple: to avoid such fleeting glory, one must adhere to the truth.

Dazhai, located in Xiyang County, Jinzhong City, Shanxi Province, was once plagued by harsh natural conditions. Under Chen’s leadership, the villagers created terraced fields and improved irrigation, seemingly altering their dependence on the weather for agriculture.

In the 1960s, Mao Zedong personally promoted the slogan "Learn from Dazhai in agriculture," turning the village into a national symbol. Chen Yonggui's fame skyrocketed, even propelling him to the position of Vice Premier overseeing agriculture. But what was the reality behind Dazhai’s glorified image?

In the summer of 1978, at the National Congress of the Chinese Agricultural Society in Taiyuan, Shanxi, delegates were organized to visit Dazhai. Chen, then Vice Premier, personally greeted the delegation and shared anecdotes about his farming experience, including a blunder when he refused to listen to agricultural experts’ advice on handling a disease affecting corn, resulting in the entire crop’s failure. The delegates were stunned by his admission that a national leader overseeing agriculture lacked basic scientific knowledge.

Interestingly, as Chen spoke, a young man sat in the corner of the stage, prompting him with statistics and agricultural terminology, a detail heard clearly through the microphone.

During the visit, delegates were guided along a predetermined route through the village. Oddly, they saw no villagers working in the fields, and every household had its doors tightly shut. They were also struck by the fact that every house had a goldfish tank and potted plants in full bloom, suggesting a scene curated to impress. This was especially peculiar, considering even the more affluent coastal cities of China did not have such luxuries at the time, let alone a village like Dazhai.

When the delegates reached the highest point of the Dazhai terraces, they were disappointed. The wheat planted on the hilltops was stunted, only six or seven inches tall, and its ears failed to develop. Meanwhile, the nearby cornfields showed similarly poor results, except for the corn within the boundaries of Dazhai, which thrived due to extra resources provided by the state, including fertilizers.

The delegates murmured amongst themselves, noting the lack of forestry and livestock farming, which undermined claims of comprehensive agricultural practices. Some remarked that Dazhai's methods hadn’t even been adopted by neighboring production teams, making the nationwide "Learn from Dazhai" campaign seem farcical.

One of the delegates, Yang Xiandong, Vice Minister of Agriculture, was particularly disturbed by Dazhai’s lack of scientific methods. Upon returning to Beijing, he organized a forum to discuss the matter and vowed to expose Dazhai’s facade.

In the spring of 1979, at a CPPCC session, Yang publicly revealed the truth about Dazhai, condemning the movement as a colossal waste that misled China’s agricultural development. He criticized Chen Yonggui for refusing to acknowledge his severe mistakes despite becoming Vice Premier.

Yang’s remarks caused an uproar, with one CPPCC member from Dazhai accusing him of slander and attacking a symbol established by Mao himself. However, Yang garnered significant support from others.

In 1981, during a State Council meeting, Dazhai’s problems were finally addressed. It was exposed that Dazhai had long engaged in fabrications and, during the Cultural Revolution, had persecuted the innocent and created numerous wrongful cases.

Dazhai’s deception was first uncovered in 1964 when a "Four Cleanups" task force revealed that the village’s actual grain yield was far below Chen Yonggui’s reports. The shock of this discovery rippled through the system, but Mao’s personal support for Chen at a birthday banquet turned Dazhai’s grain issue into a political one. In China, once a problem becomes political, science no longer plays a role. Thus, with Mao’s backing, Dazhai survived its first crisis.

Without Mao’s support, Chen Yonggui and Dazhai would not have risen to national prominence.

Dazhai became a national model, and by 1978, the road to Xiyang was paved, a luxury for that time. The town even boasted a grand guesthouse with a dining hall capable of serving over a thousand visitors at once. Here, guests ate not the local corn but delicacies from across the country. These luxuries revealed the enormous financial and material resources funneled into Dazhai from central and provincial governments to maintain its image as a national agricultural exemplar.

According to the county records, during Chen Yonggui’s 13-year reign over Xiyang (1967–1979), 9,330 farm irrigation and water conservancy projects were completed, with 98,000 acres of farmland developed or renovated. However, this came at a high human cost: 1,040 farmers were injured or killed, with 310 deaths.

During this period, Xiyang’s grain output allegedly grew by 1.89 times, but false reports inflated the figures by 270 million catties, 26% of the actual yield. This discrepancy was absorbed by local farmers, while the state received its full share of grain.

In addition, over 2,000 people in Xiyang were labeled and persecuted during the Dazhai movement, 1% of the country’s population. More than 3,000 people were formally investigated, averaging one in every 70.

Under the leadership of Liu Shugang, Xiyang began to reverse the injustices. By 1979, over 70 wrongful cases were reviewed, and many who had been punished for minor offenses, such as selling livestock or grain, taking advantage of small opportunities, engaging in extramarital affairs, or not learning from Dazhai, were exonerated. Others were imprisoned for petty theft or making “counterrevolutionary” remarks, and they were released.

In 1980, Xiyang’s efforts to right the wrongs reached their peak, and the process continued into the following year. A total of 3,028 cases were corrected, and the reputations of 2,061 people who had been labeled and persecuted during the “Learn from Dazhai” campaign were restored.

The national “Learn from Dazhai” movement, which spanned more than a decade, left China’s agriculture stagnant, rigid, and riddled with falsehoods.

Curiously, despite Dazhai’s prominence, Mao never visited. He did not even express interest in going there. In 1980, Chen Yonggui resigned from his post, and soon after, the party media began to criticize Dazhai, stripping Chen of his Politburo membership.

In 1983, Chen was assigned to serve as a consultant at a farm on the outskirts of Beijing. He died of late-stage lung cancer in March 1986 at the age of 71. Of all the party leaders, only Hua Guofeng attended his funeral.

Sources: Official Media/Online News